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We investigate the strategic pricing for leading brands sold in the carbonated soft
drink (CSD) market in the context of a ￿ exible demand speci￿cation (i.e. random
parameter nested logit) and a structural pricing equation. Our approach does not rely
upon the often used ad hoc linear approximations to demand and pro￿t-maximizing
￿rst-order conditions. We estimate the structural pricing equation using four di⁄erent
estimators (i.e. OLS, LIML, 2SLS, and GMM) and compare the implied deviation
from Bertrand-Nash competition. Our results suggest that retailers, on average, price
CSD brands below their cost, likely a result of the competitive retailing environment.
We also ￿nd CSD wholesalers price their brands signi￿cantly more cooperatively than
Bertrand-Nash would suggest, thus in￿ ating pro￿ts.
1 Introduction
The rich content of scanner data enables the estimation of structural econometric models
to be used to investigate market power and analyze policy. Recent advances in structural
approaches to empirical market power analysis combines estimated demand functions with
game-theoretic models of a particular industry to estimate its competitive nature. However,
economic and econometric theory are often silent on the speci￿c econometric estimators that
should be employed. Each one having similar, but di⁄ering restrictions on the assumptions
of the underlying sample from which the data is collected. As a result, the objective of
this study is to empirically compare several di⁄erent estimators of a supply model, and look
at the di⁄erences each one implies with respect to the nature of the competitive game the
carbonated soft drink (CSD) market plays.
The CSD category is used in our empirical analysis for several reasons. First, the in-
dustry is highly concentrated at the manufacturing level, being largely dominated by two
manufacturers. However, retail outlets have recently been introducing, and pushing, their
own private label brands as a way of expanding category pro￿ts. Second, the industry is
well known among a wide range of consumers not only in the U.S., but largely throughout
the world. Thus many retail outlets carry the same set of products making the competitive
nature of the CSD industry an empirical question at not only the manufacturer level, but
also at the retail level. Finally, given the long history of the industry, particularly in the
U.S., a steady state equilibrium is likely to exist. Thus the CSD market is an ideal category
for comparing the competitive nature implied from several di⁄erent econometric estimators.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the
econometric model used to analyze the market power of the CSD market. This section begins
with a brief overview of the demand and supply models used, followed by their speci￿cation.
1In section 3 we present the estimation methods used for the demand and supply models,
along with a description of our identi￿cation strategy. The following section details the data
used to estimate the models. Empirical results, as well as the implications of our ￿nding are
presented in section 5 and the last section concludes.
2 Econometric Model of the CSD Market
2.1 Overview
We model the CSD market using a structural model of consumer, retailer, and producer
behavior. This method ensures that our empirical results are consistent with theoretical
expectations of ￿rm behavior at all stages of the supply side. On the demand side we
model consumer￿ s discrete purchasing choices using a random parameter nested logit model.
Because CSDs are a highly di⁄erentiated food product a discrete choice framework is ap-
propriate (Jain, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta 1994; and Nevo, 2001). A random coe¢ cient
model captures unobserved household heterogeneity, while also controlling for other exoge-
nous factors that may in￿ uence a household￿ s brand decisions.
On the supply side we assume Bertrand-Nash competition among both producers and
retailers (Draganska and Klapper 2007). We parameterize deviations from the maintained
equilibrium to test both the direction and degree of diversion from Bertrand competition
(Villas-Boas and Zhao 2005; Draganska and Klapper 2007). We then estimate the model
using several di⁄erent estimation techniques to compare the implied market power in the
CSD market. We begin by explaining the consumer demand component, and continue on to
behavior by both sets of participants in the CSD supply chain.
2.2 Structural Model of CSD Demand
Consumer demand is represented by a random utility model in which consumers are assumed
to make a hierarchical decision regarding ￿rst the choice of retailer and, once this decision is
made, the choice of soft drink from the set of all products being o⁄ered, or make no purchase
at all. This latter alternative forms the outside option. Indirect utility uijkt for consumer i
obtained from purchasing product j 2 f1;2;:::;Jg; on purchasing occasion t 2 f1;2;:::;Tg;
at store k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg; is given by:
uijkt = ￿
|zjkt ￿ ￿ipjkt + ￿jkt + &ikt + (1 ￿ ￿K)"ijt; (1)
2where ￿jkt is an error term that accounts for all product-speci￿c variations in demand that
are unobserved by the econometrician such as the amount of shelf space allocated to each
product or the amount of national advertising. Product j￿ s price in store k is represented by
pjkt. The set of brand speci￿c variables zjkt contains an intercept term (￿jkt) which represents
the product-speci￿c preference parameter. Other brand attributes include an indicator of
whether the product is o⁄ered on a temporary discount (dcjkt), and an interaction term
between the retail price and the discount (dcjktpjkt) (Chintagunta, 2002). By including an
interaction term we allow for the possibility that promotions rotate the demand curve in
addition to the expected demand-shifting e⁄ect. In this way, we allow items on promotion to
become less elastic if households perceive discounting as a means of di⁄erentiating otherwise
similar products.
It is well understood that the simple logit model su⁄ers from the independence of irrele-
vant alternative (IIA) property, so we extend it in two ways. First, we explicitly account for
the hierarchical nature of a consumer￿ s choice process by using a nested logit model (McFad-
den, 1980). A nested logit model provides both an intuitive way of describing the consumer￿ s
decision and analytical solutions for the retailer￿ s pro￿t maximizing pricing decision. Nesting
by store represents a natural choice because consumers are likely to substitute among prod-
ucts (in the same category) within a store, rather than comparing products across stores.
With a nested logit model, substitution within each store still re￿ ects IIA, while between
comparison between stores does not.
In order to incorporate this nesting assumption, we allow the "ijt terms to follow a Gener-
alized Extreme Value distribution (GEV, McFadden, 1980). With the GEV assumption, we
allow for di⁄ering degrees of substitution between products across groups. The distribution
of &ik is de￿ned such that the term &ikt + (1 ￿ ￿K)"ijt is i.i.d. Type I extreme-value dis-
tributed if the consumer speci￿c error term "ijt is itself extreme-value distributed (Cardell,
1997). The parameter ￿K measures utility-correlation within each nest (store) and, as such,
is interpreted as an inverse measure of store heterogeneity. The parameter is bound between
0 and 1. If ￿K = 1 then the correlation among stores goes to 1 and stores are regarded as
perfect substitutes. On the other hand if the parameter is zero the model reverts back to
a simple multinomial logit model. We include the no purchase option (outside good) with
j = 0, which allows us to test whether sales have any general demand-expansion e⁄ects.
Based on the indirect utility model in equation (1), and following Train (2003) the level
of mean utility that varies over consumers for each choice of product j in store k is: ￿jk =
￿|zjkt ￿ ￿ipjkt + ￿jkt. So, the probability of consumer i choosing brand j in store k at time

















where Prjjk is the conditional probability of consumer i choosing brand j conditional on
brand j being in store k and Prk is the marginal probability of choosing a brand in store
k (with the marginality being over all alternatives in store k) where the utility of the no
purchase option (outside option) has been normalized to zero. This equality is exact, since
any probability can be written as the product of a marginal and a conditional probability.
Unfortunately, the GEV model still su⁄ers from the IIA property within stores, which
means that the substitution elasticities between products depends only on their market
shares and not on more fundamental attributes that are likely to in￿ uence demand. Thus,
our second extension allows the product-preference and marginal utility of income parameters
in equation (1) to vary over consumers in a random way (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995;
and Nevo, 2001). Speci￿cally, the marginal utility of income is normally distributed over
consumers such that:
￿i = ￿ + ￿￿vi; vi s N(0;1); (3)
where ￿ is the mean price response across all consumers and vi is the consumer-speci￿c
variation in response with parameter ￿￿. Furthermore, consumers are assumed to di⁄er in
their preferences for each product attribute such that unobserved consumer heterogeneity is
re￿ ected in the distribution of each brand￿ s preference parameter (Erdem, 1996; and Nair,
Chintagunta and DubØ, 2004) as follows:
￿ijkt = ￿ + ￿￿￿i; ￿i s N(0;1): (4)
In contrast to the IIA property of a simple logit model, the heterogeneity assumption in
(3) and (4) creates a general pattern of substitution over the J alternatives through the
unobserved, random part of the utility function given in (1). As a result, the utility from
di⁄erent soft drinks is correlated according to their set of attributes included in zjk. Non-
IIA substitution is critical in models of di⁄erentiated product pricing because parameter
estimates would otherwise be entirely confounded by misestimates of the partial elasticity of
demand facing each product.
With a discrete choice model of demand, it is assumed that each consumer purchases
only one unit of the chosen product. De￿ning the densities of ￿i and vi as f(￿) and g(v),
4respectively, the probability of product j being purchased in store k is obtained by integrating






















which we estimate using simulated maximum likelihood following Petrin and Train (2010)
which is described in section 3 below.
2.3 Structural Model of CSD Supply
In order to measure the degree of market power exercised by wholesalers and retailers, we
develop a model of the CSD supply chain that is used to derive equilibrium wholesale and
retail margins. We assume a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium such that suppliers quote a wholesale
price to retailers, taking into consideration the retailer￿ s response, and then retailers set
prices to be paid by consumers (Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta, 1996, 1999). We
solve the model using backward induction, ￿rst describing the second-stage pricing decision
made by retailers, and then the ￿rst-stage wholesale pricing decision. This kind of vertical
model (often referred to as a conjectural variation model) is found to ￿t well among the data
in a number of categories (Besanko, DubØ, and Gupta, 2003; Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005;
Draganska and Klapper, 2007; Berto Villas-Boas, 2007) and is found to best ￿t the CSD
category (Dhar, Chavas, Cotterill and Gould, 2005). In the remainder of this section we
derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in prices to this channel game. To make the
notation as clear as possible we suppress the time subscript t:
2.3.1 Retailer Decision
Each retailer, k, chooses prices pj for all products to maximize category pro￿ts. In other







(pj ￿ wj)sj; 8 j (6)
where Q is the total market, wj is the wholesale price, pj is the price retailers charge, and
sj is the market share of brand j. To simplify our derivation, without loss of generality, we
assume unit retailing costs are zero. Equation (6) assumes retailers maximize pro￿ts across
all product categories, and not just on a category by category basis. In other words, retail
prices re￿ ect the implicit assumption that retailers internalize all pricing externalities across
5categories. Assuming retailers behave as Stackelberg followers, our ￿rst order condition for






(pl ￿ wl) = 0; 8 j: (7)
for each retailer k. Stacking the ￿rst-order conditions for all brands and solving for retail
prices in matrix notation yields:
p = w ￿ S
￿1
p S; (8)
where p is a J ￿1 vector of retail prices, w is a J ￿1 vector of wholesale prices, S is a J ￿1
vector of market shares, and Sp is a J ￿ J matrix of share derivatives with respect to all
retail prices. Since suppliers are assumed to take retailers￿optimal responses into account
in setting upstream prices, equation (8) represents the retail decision rule that frames their
pricing decisions.
2.3.2 Wholesaler Decision
Wholesalers are assumed to set prices such that the surplus they obtain over production
costs is maximized for all the products they supply, while taking into account the retailers￿








sj(wj ￿ cj); 8j; (9)
where cj denotes the (constant) production cost of product j incurred by the wholesaler and











(wj ￿ cj) = 0: 8j (10)
However, the retail-wholesale pass-pass through term @pk=@wj represents values that are not
observable in the data. Therefore, we recover each pass-through rate by totally di⁄erentiating
the retailer￿ s ￿rst order condition as in Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005). In other words, by
totally di⁄erentiating equation (7) we solve for @pk=@wj with respect to all wholesale prices.













































; 8 j;k (12)
6Using the above expression, we write the wholesale margin in matrix notation as:
w ￿ c = ￿((G
￿1Sp)Sp ￿ IN)
￿1S; (13)
where IN is a J ￿ J identity matrix and * indicates element by element multiplication.
Substituting this expression back into the solution for retail prices provides a single expression
for the whole - retail plus wholesale - margin in which the wholesale price is equal to the
retail price minus the retail margin and wholesale margin:
p = c ￿ S
￿1
p S ￿ ((G
￿1Sp)Sp ￿ IN)
￿1S (14)
where the ￿rst expression on the right side is the marginal cost, the second expression on
the right side is the retail margin and the third represents the wholesale margin. At this
point, all of the parameters required to identify the wholesaler￿ s cost are contained in the
price and demand side estimates (p; Sp; and G). Marginal costs (c), in turn, are estimated
as a linear function of input prices, such that:
c = #
|￿; (15)
where ￿ is a vector of input prices and # is a vector of parameters to be estimated. This
function is estimated after substituting the demand parameters into equation (14) in the
three-step procedure described in detail in section 3.
2.3.3 Measuring Market Power
The model of wholesale and retail margins in equation (14) is derived under the assumption of
Bertrand-Nash rivalry. However, by parameterizing deviations from Bertrand-Nash (Villas-
Boas and Zhao, 2005), we test for the presence of market power among either wholesalers
or retailers. We augment the margin expressions in equation (14) by introducing multipliers
￿, and ￿ in a manner similar to Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) and Draganska and Klapper
(2007). To clarify our exposition, let mR = ￿S
￿1
p S, be the retail margin, and let mW =
￿((G
￿1Sp)Sp ￿ IN)￿1S denote the wholesale margin. Then with the introduction of the
multipliers we can rewrite equation (14) as:
p = c + ￿m
R + ￿m
W: (16)
Notice that if ￿ or ￿ are greater than 1 then retailers, or wholesalers, respectively, are pricing
more cooperatively than in the Bertrand Nash equilibrium, whereas ￿, or ￿ less than 1 would
suggest that the ￿rms are pricing more competitively.
7The estimating equations for the full model are, therefore, equation (5) for the demand
side, and equation (16) for the supply side with equation (15) substituted for the marginal




W + ￿; (17)
where ￿ captures variations in price that are not explained by the model and are assumed to
be i.i.d. The key hypothesis tests, therefore, involve ￿ and ￿.
3 Estimation Method
There are several complications to address when estimating the demand (5) and supply mod-
els (17) above. The share equation cannot be estimated using ordinary least squares because
prices are likely to be correlated with elements in the error term "ijk. Promotional activi-
ties, in-store merchandising, and other strategies cause price and market share to be jointly
endogenous, making our estimates biased (Villas-Boas and Winer, 1999). We therefore use
simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimation following Petrin and Train (2010), who
suggest a control function approach whose econometric foundation is found in the sample-
selection models of Heckman (1978) and Hausman (1978). The idea of the control function
approach is to derive a proxy variable that conditions on the part of the endogenous price
variable, thus making the remaining variation in the price variable independent of the error
term. Then the standard simulated maximum likelihood approach will be consistent.
Speci￿cally, we regress the endogenous variable, price, against a set of instrumental vari-
ables (which are detailed below) via OLS and obtain the residuals, ￿ijkt, from this model.
The residuals from this regression are independent of the original error term "ijk: The con-
trol function is then de￿ned as the linear combination: CF(￿ijktj￿) = E("ijkj￿ijkt) = ￿ ￿ijkt,
where ￿ is a parameter to be estimated. We then let ￿ = ￿0 + ￿￿￿; where ￿ s N(0;1) to
allow for greater ￿ exibility. The control function, CF(￿ijktj￿), is then added to the utility
function given in equation (1). The full model, including the control function, is then esti-
mated using SML which uses Monte Carlo simulation to solve the integral in equation (5) up
to an approximation that is accurate to the number of random draws chosen, R: This method
provides consistent parameter estimates under general error assumptions and is readily able
to accommodate complex structures regarding consumer heterogeneity.
To identify the endogenous price variable, we require instruments that are correlated
with price, but not the unobservables in the demand equation. Because there could be
8market and time speci￿c price shocks in one particular market or time, we include a set
of market and quarter speci￿c binary variables as well as a constant term. Furthermore,
because input prices are likely to be correlated with price, but not the error term in the
demand equation, we also include retail and production input prices. We then exploit the
panel data nature of the model and interact these input prices with a set of binary market
speci￿c variables. Finally, because it is possible that the price variable is capturing the state
dependence of consumer demand over time due to habit, learning, or inertia of purchasing
habits, a lagged share value and lagged price of 1 week are also included. The lagged price
and share values are pre-determined from the perspective of current-period demand are thus
appropriate instruments. Our identi￿cation strategy is well-accepted in the literature (Berto
Villas-Boas, 2007; Draganska and Klapper, 2007).
Estimating the models sequentially in this way can cause a compounding error problem
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). However, we ￿nd this unlikely because the parameter estimates
of the estimated model are very similar to those that result if the control function is not
included in the utility speci￿cation.1 Therefore, we conclude that the compounding error
problem is, at most, negligible and do not employ a boot strapping method. To aid in the
speed and e¢ ciency of SML estimation, we include a Halton draw sequence. Halton draws
can signi￿cantly reduce the number of draws with no degradation of simulation performance
(Bhat, 2003). We ￿nd that R = 200 draws are su¢ cient to produce stable estimates without
excessive estimation time. Bhat (2003) provides experimental evidence that Halton sequences
can reduce the number of draws required to produce estimates at a given accuracy by a factor
of 10.
In estimating the supply model, we use several di⁄erent estimators to investigate the
di⁄erence in the competitive nature implications from each. First, brand speci￿c price shocks
could a⁄ect the price of carbonated soft drinks. To account for this, we add binary indicator
variables for the 19 most popular brands.2;3 Second, given the retail and wholesale margins
are likely to be endogenous we require a single equation instrumental variable (IV) estima-
tor. Speci￿cally, we estimate equation (17) using 2SLS, LIML, and GMM. For comparison
purposes with an inconsistent estimator, we also use OLS. 2SLS is a natural choice for an
estimator because the model is linear, and the consistency of the estimator in the presence
1These results are available from the authors upon request.
2We had also included market speci￿c binary variables to account for any market speci￿c price shocks but
found these were not relevant in explaining price. They were therefore excluded from the ￿nal speci￿cation.
3The 13 least popular brands of our sample were not purchased as often and as a result were not found
to be signi￿cant in explaining price. They were therefore excluded from the ￿nal speci￿cation.
9of endogenous variables is well understood (Theil 1953, and Basmann, 1957). However, the
LIML estimator has been shown to have less bias in ￿nite samples, but, due to its lack
of ￿nite moments, tends to have a wider sampling distribution (Davidson and MacKinnon,
2004). Both of these estimators, along with OLS, are members of the k-class estimators
(Theil, 1961).4 Finally, we use the GMM estimator because it is the most general estima-
tor and is by far the most widely used in current application of market power estimation
(Hansen, 1982).
For the IV estimators of the supply function we require instruments that are correlated
with the endogenous margin variables, but not the unobservables in the pricing equation.
Therefore, we use a similar set of IVs as those described for the demand model. The di⁄erence
here is that instead of interacting the input prices with market speci￿c binary variables, they
are interacted with brand speci￿c binary variables. While demand shocks are likely to occur
at the market level, wholesalers and retailers are likely to decide their margin level brand by
brand. This identi￿cation is well accepted in the literature (Berto Villas-Boas, 2007).
Though simultaneous estimation of the demand and supply models is preferred, sequential
estimation of the demand model and then the supply model is necessary as the estimates
of the demand model are used directly in the estimation of supply. Sequential estimation
of the demand and margin equations in this way is common in the literature and has been
shown to produce results that di⁄er little from those obtained with simultaneous estimation
(Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005).
4 Data Description
The empirical estimation requires CSD retail level sales data. Consequently, this study uses
Nielsen research group￿ s Scantrack data, which measures weekly retail sales for 52 weeks
in 2005. The data consist of dollar sales, unit volume (ounces), promotion attributes, and
product speci￿c identi￿ers. The Scantrack data features weekly sales information at the
UPC level for participating retailers in 52 markets. Covering all 52 markets would have been
intractable so we focus on the 5 largest markets: Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; New York,
NY; Atlanta, GA; and Philadelphia, PA. This sample of markets provides a wide variety of
supermarkets representative of most retail outlets and prices. In total we have 143 retailers
yielding 163;593 observations.
Because the Scantrack data features sales information for supermarkets only, the outside
4Mariano (2001) gives a more recent account of the ￿nite sample properties of 2SLS, LIML, and other
k-class estimators.
10option consists of the entire potential market for soft drink sales. Following Nevo (2001) and
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) the size of the whole market is calculated on a weekly
basis by multiplying each of the total metropolitan statistical areas￿populations by the USDA
estimate of per capita consumption of soft drinks. The di⁄erence between the inside and
outside option is then reduced to CSDs sold through convenience stores, food service outlets,
and by retailers that do not participate in the retail-scanner data syndication (Wal-mart,
Costco, and other club and super stores).
There are a large number of products available in the CSD category ￿too large to model
in a tractable way and obtain reliable estimates of each products￿mark-up. Therefore, we
choose thirty three brands that were common among all markets and retailers with the
highest market share.5 The brands used, along with their summary statistics are shown
in table 1. The fact that soft drinks are a di⁄erentiated food category is evident in the
variability of prices among brands.
[Insert table 1]
Wholesale input costs consist of market-speci￿c indices of commercial electricity prices,
and the prices of: high fructose corn syrup, sugar, aluminum, and diesel. These input price
indices were obtained from the USDA (USDA-NASS) database and their summary statistics
are available in table 1. In order to avoid losing the detailed weekly variation in the CSD
sales data the input prices are smoothed from monthly to weekly observations. This linear
￿lter approach is common in empirical industrial organization research (e.g. Slade, 1995).
5 Empirical Results and Discussion
In this section we ￿rst present the demand estimates in order to establish the validity of the
demand model. We then present the supply-side model estimates and compare the market
power implications across the di⁄erent estimation methods for both retailers and wholesalers.
5.1 CSD Demand Results
The demand for CSDs is modeled using a random coe¢ cient nested logit model with a control
function added to the utility function to alleviate endogeneity in the pricing variable. As
a ￿rst step to interpreting the results, we test the validity of the random-parameter nested
logit model against a simple logit alternative. A simple speci￿cation test involves testing the
signi￿cance of the GEV scale parameter, ￿K. If ￿K = 0, then the GEV model collapses to a
5Diet sodas were excluded because retail price information wasn￿ t available.
11standard mixed logit. In the results shown in table 2, the t-ratio for the null hypothesis that
￿K = 0 is 815:95, so we easily reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the GEV model
is preferred. Furthermore, it is common in the retailing literature to assume that individual
stores price as local monopolists (Chintagunta, 2002). However, the GEV scale parameter,
￿K, which represents a measure of the extent to which consumers substitute among stores,
does not support this assumption as the stores in the sampled markets are regarded as very
good ￿but not perfect ￿substitutes for each other (￿K = 0:925, while ￿K = 1:0 implies
perfect substitutability).6
[Insert table 2]
Next, we compare the random-parameter nested logit to a constant parameter alternative.
For this purpose, we use a likelihood-ratio (LR) test where the constant parameter model is
the restricted version and the random parameter is the unrestricted version. The LR statistic
for this test is 13:177, which is Chi-square distributed with 3 degrees of freedom. The Chi-
square value at the 5% level of signi￿cance is 7:814, therefore we reject the simpler model and
conclude that the random parameter model is a better ￿t. Further, the signi￿cance of the
variance parameters in the random coe¢ cients model further supports this speci￿cation over
a ￿xed-coe¢ cient alternative. Therefore, we can conclude that the random parameter model
is preferred to the constant-parameter alternative, so we will use this version to interpret
the demand results.
As a ￿nal speci￿cation test, we investigate the endogeneity of the price variable. Following
Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) we test the hypothesis that ￿0 = 0 using a simple
t-test. We ￿nd the test statistic for this hypothesis is ￿3:48 so we conclude that ￿0 6= 0 at the
5% level of signi￿cance and the price variable is indeed endogenous. We test the relevance
of the IVs by regressing the price variable on them. These results are presented in table 3.
We ￿nd the F-statistic for this regression is 71;724:6, so the IVs are indeed relevant (Staiger
and Stock, 1997). As a last step to evaluating the IVs, we test their exogeneity following
Hansen (1982) and ￿nd a test statistic of 2568:68, which is Chi-square distributed with 10
degrees of freedom. This suggests the IVs are not strictly exogenous to the error term in
the demand model. However, the R2 from the regression of the demand model￿ s error term
on the IVs was only 0:016: Furthermore, many di⁄erent IVs were used, and the ones chosen
were found to have the smallest J-statistic. We therefore argue that the IVs used were the
best available.
6A formal test of the hypothesis: Ho : ￿K = 1 produces a t-ratio of 65:95, so we reject the null hypothesis
and conclude that soft drinks from di⁄erent stores are not perfect substitutes.
12[Insert table 3]
There are a number of results from the CSD demand model that are of substantive interest
to CSD retailers and manufacturers. First, the marginal utility of income (price coe¢ cient)
is negative and signi￿cant as expected. We also ￿nd the standard deviation of the price
coe¢ cient is greater than 1, and signi￿cant at the 5% level. This suggests that there is a
signi￿cant degree of heterogeneity among consumers when it comes to their marginal utility
of income for carbonated soft drinks.7 Second, the discount and price interaction term shift
the demand curve out during a promotion week and rotate it clockwise (more inelastic).
Both of these results are as retailers intend.
5.2 Market Power Results
We now present the results of the supply model for the various estimation routines. Before
we interpret the results of the parameters of interest, namely ￿ and ￿, we test the endogeneity
of the two margin measures, followed by tests of relevance and exogeneity of the IVs chosen.
In order to test whether or not the two margin measures are indeed endogenous we use the
Hausman test (Hausman 1978). From table 5 the Hausman test statistics from the 2SLS and
GMM estimators suggest that the margin variables are indeed endogenous while the hypoth-
esis is not rejected in the case of the LIML estimator. Given the wide sampling distribution
of the LIML estimator we conclude that the margin variables are indeed endogenous. There-
fore, an IV estimation routine is appropriate in order to get consistent parameter estimates.
We now test the hypothesis that the IVs are not relevant. For the wholesale margin vari-
able we reject the hypothesis and conclude that the IVs are indeed relevant. However, the
F-statistic from the regression of the retail margin on the IVs suggests they are not rele-
vant to the retail margin measure. Nevertheless, many di⁄erent IV combinations were used,
and in each case, the F-statistic was very low, always below 1:5. Therefore, we once again
argue that the IVs used were the best available. Finally, we test the exogeneity of the IVs
following Hansen (1982) and ￿nd the test statistics are 30:65, 1158:05, and 2208:11, for the
LIML, 2SLS, and GMM estimators respectively, which are all Chi-square distributed with 39
degrees of freedom which yields a critical value of 54:572. In the case of the LIML estimator
the IVs are indeed exogenous. However, in the case of 2SLS, and GMM we conclude the IVs
are not strictly exogenous. However, we ￿nd the uncentered-R2 is 0:0072, and 0:0138 for the
7For comparison, the price coe¢ cient estimate and standard deviation of the model estimated without
the control function included is: -.36891 (-24.40), and 4.21742 (423.58) respectively, with the t-ratios is
parentheses.
132SLS and GMM estimators respectively, which are indeed quite small.8
[Insert table 4]
In this model, the conduct parameters are interpreted as measuring the extent of deviation
from the maintained competitive nature assumed, on the part of either retailers (￿), or
wholesalers (￿) (Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005; Draganska and Klapper, 2007). In the retail
case, the competitive nature assumed is Bertrand-Nash pricing, so an estimated value of
￿ > 1 implies retailers, on average, price CSDs more cooperatively than Bertrand-Nash
would predict, while ￿ < 1 suggests retailers price them more competitively. Upstream
wholesale deviations are interpreted in the same way. Finally, we note that if ￿ = ￿ = 0,
then retailers and wholesalers, respectively, do not take advantage of the di⁄erentiated nature
of their products and price as purely competitive sellers would.
The results for the four di⁄erent estimators are presented in table 5. Consistent across
all estimators is the sign of the parameter estimates of ￿ and ￿, where ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 0.
However, the OLS and LIML estimator suggest that ￿ is not statistically di⁄erent from 0 at
the 5% or 10% level of signi￿cance. On the other hand, both the 2SLS and GMM estimators
agree that ￿ < 0. The results of the four estimators taken together imply that retailers in
general price CSDs at (OLS and LIML) or below (2SLS and GMM) their costs. While these
results are somewhat counterintuitive, if we take into consideration the myriad of product
categories within the food retailing environment it may be pro￿table for retailers to price
one category at or below cost to attract new customers to the store (e.g. loss leader pricing).
Several studies suggest that promoting one product, or category - even below cost -
can have a sales expansion e⁄ect for a particular retailer as a whole (Hess and Gerstner,
1987; Walters, and MacKenzie, 1988; and Hosken and Rei⁄en, 2001). Thus in the context
of our results, it may be the case that retailers are pricing CSDs such that the average
price promotion in the category provides a loss to the retailer in that category, but an
increase in pro￿ts overall as a result of an increase in sales in all other categories. Extending
this research to speci￿cally include the competitive interactions among retailers and retail
price promotions at the category level Chintagunta (2002) and Richards (2007) conclude
that promotions have their greatest impact on in-store product share, but promotions can
increase store share if consumers regard the retailers has highly substitutable. Another
possible explanation for observing retailers pricing CSDs at or below cost may have to do
with manufacturers o⁄ering incentives to retailers to promote their products. Speci￿cally,
8The regression results of the pricing equation error term on the IVs are available from the authors upon
request.
14Agrawal (1996) and Lal and Villas-Boas (1998) develop a theoretical model of manufacturer
and retailer competition that suggest manufacturers selling brands with little brand loyalty
will incentivize retailers to promote their brand through price promotion, while retailers will
frequently o⁄er promotions on brands with a high level of brand loyalty to capture market
share from other retailers.
[Insert table 5]
Looking more closely at the results of manufacturer market power (￿), we ￿nd once again
that all four estimators agree that manufacturers price CSDs above purely competitive lev-
els. However, the magnitude di⁄ers signi￿cantly among estimators. First, the OLS estimator
suggests wholesalers price their brands only slightly above competitive levels. Given the en-
dogeneity of the margin variables, the OLS parameter estimates are likely biased downward.
Second, the parameter estimate from the LIML estimator implies wholesalers price their
products signi￿cantly more cooperatively than Bertrand-Nash competition. The t-statistic
from the parameter estimate suggests it is not statistically di⁄erent from 0 at the 10% level
of signi￿cance however. This suggests the parameter is not statistically di⁄erent from zero,
which is not surprising given the LIML estimator tends to have a wider sampling distribution
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). Finally, the 2SLS and GMM estimates, both having simi-
lar parameter estimates as expected, suggest that wholesalers price their brands signi￿cantly
more cooperative than Bertrand-Nash competition. Given that the industry is dominated by
two suppliers, this is not a surprising result. It is also unlikely that wholesalers are o⁄ering
trade deals to retailers to promote their brands. Rather, it seems that retailers are discount-
ing the brands in the CSD category as a means of competing for retail market share. This
likely expands CSD category sales, which greatly increases the pro￿t of the wholesalers.
6 Conclusion and Implications
In this study we estimate the market power of both retailers and wholesalers in the carbon-
ated soft drink market. Pass-through is modeled using a structural model of each retail food
outlet. Demand is assumed to be discrete, which we estimate using a random parameter,
nested logit model with a control function added to account for the endogeneity of price.
We then assume Bertrand-Nash pricing such that the wholesaler quotes a price to the retail,
taking into consideration the retailer￿ s response, while the retailer then sets retail prices in
a two stage, non-cooperative game theoretic framework. We derive the retail pricing equa-
tion directly from the ￿rst-order conditions for multi-product retail pro￿t maximization, and
15the wholesale pricing equations indirectly due to the unobservability of the wholesale pass-
through term. For both retailers and wholesalers, pricing conduct is allowed to deviate from
either the competitive benchmark or complete collusion through the inclusion of a conduct
parameter. This allows us to empirically investigate the degree of market power among
either retailers or wholesalers.
The supply model is estimated using several di⁄erent IV estimators to compare the
competitive nature implied by each. Speci￿cally OLS, 2SLS, LIML, and GMM are used
with 52 weeks of retail scanner data covering 2005. The OLS and LIML estimators suggest
retailers price CSDs at their respective prices, while the 2SLS and GMM estimators suggest
retailers are pricing the category below cost. These results are consistent with previous
research that investigates the competitive nature of the food retailing market and suggest
retailers price speci￿c categories at or below cost as a mean of expanding overall store sales
(Hess and Gerstner, 1987; Hosken and Rei⁄en, 2001; and Richards, 2007).
On the wholesale side, the OLS parameter estimate suggests that margins, while positive,
are very narrow. However, the OLS estimate is biased downward as a result of the endoge-
nous margin variables. The magnitude of the conduct parameter from the LIML estimator
suggests wholesalers price their products signi￿cantly more cooperatively than Bertrand-
Nash would imply. Though, due to the wide sampling distribution of the LIML estimator,
the hypothesis that the parameter is statistically di⁄erent from zero is not rejected. Finally,
the results of the 2SLS and GMM estimates agree that wholesalers are in fact pricing their
products signi￿cantly more cooperatively then Bertrand-Nash would suggest. Given the
competitive nature of the retailing environment, wholesalers are likely taking advantage of
retailer￿ s dependence on CSD price promotions to capture in￿ ated wholesale margins and
excess pro￿t. On the other hand, this may be because wholesalers compete for market
share through venues other than price competition, such as new product introductions and
advertising. The speci￿c nature of wholesalers in￿ ated prices is a matter for future research.
While our results were robust across the di⁄erent estimators and various speci￿cations
of demand, there are several shortcomings of the paper that should be addressed. First, the
demand model relies heavily on the assumption that consumers choose one product / brand
within the category in a single shopping trip. This assumption is a bit overly restrictive for
the CSD market and can generate incorrect consumer responses to marketing mix variables
which could e⁄ect the margin estimates (DubØ, 2004). Second, if consumers stockpile then
static estimates of long-run price sensitivity may be overstated (Hendel and Nevo, 2006).
However, we were unable to account for this in the demand model because information on
16consumer inventory levels was not available. Additional research is needed to account for
these weaknesses.
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20Table 1: Carbonated Soft Drink Summary Statistics.
Price Unit Mean Std. Dev Max Min
Overall Product Price cents per oz. 0.0865 0.1160 0.9626 0.0020
A & W cents per oz. 0.0166 0.0032 0.0247 0.0047
Barq￿ s cents per oz. 0.0186 0.0035 0.0249 0.0077
Canada Dry cents per oz. 0.0176 0.0066 0.0530 0.0074
Coca-Cola Cherry cents per oz. 0.0214 0.0042 0.0347 0.0081
Coca-Cola Ca⁄eine Free cents per oz. 0.0229 0.0048 0.0353 0.0117
Coca-Cola cents per oz. 0.0320 0.0175 0.0725 0.0069
Private Label cents per oz. 0.0116 0.0039 0.0208 0.0074
Dr. Pepper Ca⁄eine Free cents per oz. 0.0229 0.0037 0.0284 0.0125
Dr. Pepper cents per oz. 0.0184 0.0038 0.0328 0.0030
Fanta cents per oz. 0.0177 0.0041 0.0331 0.0053
I.B.C. cents per oz. 0.0512 0.0075 0.0554 0.0347
Monster cents per oz. 0.1337 0.0076 0.1369 0.0994
Mountain Dew Code Red cents per oz. 0.0154 0.0028 0.0226 0.0086
Mountain Dew cents per oz. 0.0319 0.0205 0.0740 0.0047
MUG cents per oz. 0.0171 0.0028 0.0250 0.0089
Pepsi Ca⁄eine Free cents per oz. 0.0167 0.0036 0.0247 0.0072
Pepsi cents per oz. 0.0315 0.0197 0.0710 0.0044
Pepsi Vanilla cents per oz. 0.0164 0.0040 0.0220 0.0055
Pepsi Wild Cherry cents per oz. 0.0165 0.0033 0.0247 0.0030
Perrier cents per oz. 0.0601 0.0202 0.0876 0.0296
RC cents per oz. 0.0149 0.0010 0.0189 0.0102
Red Bull cents per oz. 0.2399 0.0146 0.2880 0.1955
S. Pellegrino cents per oz. 0.0663 0.0097 0.0707 0.0296
Schweppes cents per oz. 0.0225 0.0123 0.0536 0.0058
Seagram￿ s cents per oz. 0.0185 0.0047 0.0312 0.0108
7 Up cents per oz. 0.0109 0.0145 0.0526 0.0003
Shasta cents per oz. 0.0152 0.0038 0.0267 0.0069
Sierra Mist cents per oz. 0.0265 0.0191 0.0695 0.0038
Sprite cents per oz. 0.0307 0.0188 0.0730 0.0033
Squirt cents per oz. 0.0178 0.0033 0.0277 0.0069
Sunkist cents per oz. 0.0166 0.0050 0.0645 0.0044
Vintage cents per oz. 0.0152 0.0033 0.0204 0.0074
Welch￿ s cents per oz. 0.0148 0.0010 0.0185 0.0102
Electricity Cost $ per 1000 kWh 99.5769 4.7386 106.0000 92.0000
High Fructose Corn Syrup cents per lb. 21.1117 0.6256 21.4900 19.4800
Sugar cents per 10 lbs. 9.8419 1.3456 13.7180 8.51000
Aluminum $ per Metric Ton 187.9300 11.1521 223.1510 173.1940




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 3: OLS regression of the endogenous price variable on IVs..
Variable Estimate t-ratio.
Constant 0.5581* 78.96
Lagged Price (1 week) 0.9600* 1213.66
lagged Prk (1 week) 0.0000* -10.35
HFCS*Chicago, IL -0.0206* -72.14
HFCS*Los Angeles, CA -0.0210* -73.96
HFCS*New York, NY -0.0211* -61.21
HFCS*Atlanta, GA -0.0203* -67.53
HFCS*Philadelphia, PA -0.0205* -72.40
Aluminum*Chicago, IL 0.0001* 4.86
Aluminum*Los Angeles, CA 0.0002* 10.56
Aluminum*New York, NY 0.0002* 6.19
Aluminum*Atlanta, GA 0.0000 0.76
Aluminum*Philadelphia, PA 0.0000* 2.75
Diesel*Chicago, IL -0.0022* -34.63
Diesel*Los Angeles, CA -0.0024* -39.00
Diesel*New York, NY -0.0024* -22.14
Diesel*Atlanta, GA -0.0021* -27.18
Diesel*Philadelphia, PA -0.0022* -34.90
Corn*Chicago, IL -0.0377* -32.45
Corn*Los Angeles, CA -0.0414* -36.57
Corn*New York, NY -0.0417* -20.43
Corn*Atlanta, GA -0.0341* -24.00
Corn*Philadelphia, PA -0.0345* -30.55
R2 0.906
F-Stat. 71,724.6
* Indicates signi￿cance at the 95% level.
Dependent variable: Price
HFCS - High Fructose Corn Syrup price.
23Table 4: OLS regression of the endogenous measures of the margin variable on IVs.
Dependent Variable: Retail Margin Wholesale Marg.
Variable Estimate t-ratio. Estimate t-ratio.
Chicago IL -0.0215 -0.31 -0.0116* -10.13
Los Angeles CA 0.0275 0.41 -0.0068* -6.11
New York NY 0.0132 0.18 -0.0108* -8.97
Atlanta GA 0.0228 0.33 0.0044* 3.86
A & W 0.2546 0.01 0.1171 0.40
Barq￿ s 0.4905 0.18 0.0102 0.22
Canada Dry 0.1995 0.07 0.0152 0.32
Coca-Cola Cherry 0.6496 0.20 -0.0103 -0.19
Coca-Cola Ca⁄eine Free 1.3737 0.28 0.0808 1.00
Coca-Cola -0.0038 0.00 -0.0124 -0.16
Private Label 0.4336 0.07 -0.0055 -0.05
. . .
HFCS*A & W -0.0118 -0.02 -0.0029 -0.25
HFCS*Barq￿ s -0.0149 -0.14 -0.0001 -0.09
HFCS*Canada Dry -0.0077 -0.07 -0.0001 -0.07
HFCS*Coca-Cola Cherry -0.0229 -0.18 0.0015 0.73
HFCS*Coca-Cola Ca⁄eine Free -0.0391 -0.20 -0.0026 -0.80
HFCS*Coca-Cola 0.0026 0.01 0.0004 0.15
HFCS*Private Label -0.0155 -0.06 0.0023 0.57
. . .
Sugar*A & W -0.0032 -0.01 -0.0013 -0.24
Sugar*Barq￿ s -0.0145 -0.28 -0.0002 -0.29
Sugar*Canada Dry -0.0023 -0.04 -0.0005 -0.57
Sugar*Coca-Cola Cherry -0.0148 -0.24 0.0002 0.27
Sugar*Coca-Cola Ca⁄eine Free -0.0497 -0.54 -0.0018 -1.24
Sugar*Coca-Cola -0.0042 -0.05 0.0001 0.07
Sugar*Private Label -0.0085 -0.07 0.0020 1.06
. . .
Lagged Price (1 week) -0.1292 -0.74 -0.0040 -1.41
lagged Prk (1 week) -0.0002 -0.82 -0.0000* -14.77
lagged Prjjk (1 week) 0.0293 0.36 0.0108* 8.08
Uncentered R2 0.00032 0.02906
F-Statistic 0.8 76.2
* Indicates signi￿cance at the 95% level.
. . . - For space￿ s sake the rest were omitted, but they were similar to those shown.
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